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SHARE THE WEALTH? KERR V
BARANOW AND THE “JOINT FAMILY
VENTURE”
Jennifer Flood*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada has issued an important decision
in Kerr v. Baranow1 regarding property claims between
unmarried partners upon separation. The most notable aspect of
the decision is a change to the available remedies for a
successful unjust enrichment claim. The Court confirmed that a
monetary award need not be calculated on a fee-for-services
basis, but may reflect a share of the wealth acquired during the
relationship proportionate to the claimant's contributions. This
remedy is available only upon proof that the partners were
engaged in a “joint family venture”. I will assess this
development in the law in terms of the likely effect of the
definition of the joint family venture on women's inequality,
the Court’s conception of the family with an underpinning
focus on individual choice in relationships, and the capacity of
the new framework to adequately recognize women's
contributions to the wealth acquired during a relationship.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to assess the changes made in Kerr v. Baranow, I will
provide a brief overview of the development of the law of
unjust enrichment in the family law context, which originated
from trust principles developed in English law. The use of
*
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1

Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 SCR 269 [Kerr, SCC].
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resulting and constructive trust remedies in property claims by
spouses dates back prior to matrimonial property legislation.
While the distinction between resulting and constructive trusts
was sometimes blurred in the context of marital relationships,
the two trusts have different historical origins. Resulting trusts
arose based on the presumed intention of the parties where one
person held title to property for which another person provided
consideration, while constructive trusts arose by operation of
law on grounds of fairness.2
In the 1950s and 1960s, courts in England and Canada
struggled with how to deal with the division of assets upon
marriage breakdown. The application of traditional trust
presumptions, including the resulting trust, in the context of
marital relationships was criticised as being artificial and
unhelpful.3 In Rimmer v. Rimmer,4 a 1952 decision of the
English Court of Appeal, it was decided for the first time that
an equal division of property between two spouses was
appropriate, applying the maxim “equality is equity”. The facts
were that one spouse had contributed financially and
substantially, but in an unquantifiable amount, to an asset
acquired in the other’s name, and there was no evidence as to
their intentions. Two schools of thought emerged on the
interpretation of this case: those who thought that the Court
divided property equally in the absence of any intent to share,
and those who thought that the Court found an “implied intent”
to share equally.5
2

Simone Wong, “Constructive trusts over the family home: lessons to
be learned from other commonwealth jurisdictions?” (1998) 18 LS
369 at 370.

3

Donovan WM Waters, Mark R Gillen & Lionel D Smith, eds,
Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: Thomson, 2005) at
418-419.

4

Rimmer v Rimmer, [1952] 2 All ER 863, [1953] 1 QB 63 [Rimmer].

5

Waters, Gillen, & Smith, supra note 3 at 419.
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In Gissing v. Gissing6 and Pettitt v. Pettitt,7 the House
of Lords confirmed that intent was required for a trust to exist,
referring to “resulting, implied or constructive trusts” without
distinction. Courts could not impose or ascribe an intent in
order to get to a fair solution such as an equal division, and the
“equality is equity” approach was restricted to the particular
circumstances of the Rimmer case. A claimant’s success thus
turned on the willingness of a court to find an implied common
intention to share property.8
The Supreme Court of Canada initially followed the
English approach taken in Gissing and Pettitt. A resulting trust
was a difficult remedy to obtain since the claimant had to prove
that she made a direct financial contribution to the acquisition
of property held by her spouse,9 or that there was a common
intention that a beneficial interest in the property was held for
her. For example, in Murdoch v. Murdoch,10 the majority
declined to award Ms. Murdoch a share of the farm property
held by her husband on the basis that she had not contributed
financially to the acquisition of the property, and there was no
common intention that she would get a share. Laskin J., in
dissent, would have held that her contributions in labour on the
farm were sufficient to make out a claim in unjust enrichment
for which she could be awarded a constructive trust remedy.

6

Gissing v Gissing, [1970] 2 All ER 780, [1970] 3 WLR 255
[Gissing].

7

Pettitt v Pettitt, [1969] 2 All ER 385, [1969] 2 WLR 966 [Pettitt].

8

Waters, supra note 3 at 420-421.

9

Thompson v Thompson, [1961] SCR 3, (1960) 26 DLR (2d) 1.

10

Murdoch v Murdoch, [1975] 1 SCR 423, (1973) 41 DLR (3d) 367
[Murdoch cited to SCR].
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In Rathwell v. Rathwell,11 the Supreme Court of
Canada departed from the English authorities and developed a
unique approach using the law of unjust enrichment as a basis
for the imposition of a constructive trust, building on Laskin
J.’s dissent in Murdoch. The facts in Rathwell were similar to
those in Murdoch, but the majority held that Ms. Rathwell's
claim succeeded both on the basis of a resulting trust due to her
direct contribution to the acquisition of the property, and on the
basis that her contributions in labour on the farm made out a
claim in unjust enrichment. In order to make a successful
unjust enrichment claim, the claimant must show that the
defendant was enriched, that she suffered a corresponding
deprivation, and that there was no juristic reason for the
enrichment.12 The acquisition of property by the husband,
which he would not have acquired if not for the wife's labour,
constituted an unjust enrichment. A remedial constructive trust
was imposed on the basis that he could not in good conscience
retain the beneficial interest in the property.13
Although provincial matrimonial property legislation
was enacted in the 1970s and introduced a regime in which
property or the value thereof is presumptively divided equally
between spouses upon divorce, it did not apply to unmarried
couples. Therefore, unmarried partners continued to claim trust
remedies to get a share of property. The majority in Pettkus v.
Becker held that there was “no basis for any distinction, in
dividing property and assets, between marital relationships and
those more informal relationships which subsist for a lengthy
period.”14 In Sorochan v. Sorochan, the Court held that a
11

Rathwell v Rathwell, [1978] 2 SCR 436, (1977) 83 DLR (3d) 289
[Rathwell cited to SCR].

12

Ibid at 455.

13

Ibid at 461.

14

Pettkus v Becker, [1980] 2 SCR 834 at 850, (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257
[Pettkus].

Share the Wealth?

claimant's contributions need not relate to the acquisition of
property. A contribution to the preservation, maintenance and
improvement of property is sufficient for a constructive trust.15
Finally, in Peter v. Beblow, the Court held that domestic
services were sufficient to make out a claim in unjust
enrichment. However, the Court limited the remedial
constructive trust by holding that it is only available if a
monetary award would be inadequate and there is a link
between the claimant's contributions and the specific
property.16
The above line of cases from the Supreme Court of
Canada represents an incremental recognition that women's
contributions to a spousal relationship should be recognized as
economic contributions, and that this should not depend on
whether she is married. This progress came to somewhat of a
halt when the constitutional challenge in Nova Scotia (Attorney
General) v. Walsh17 failed. Walsh argued that the exclusion of
unmarried spouses from the provincial matrimonial property
regime was a violation of the equality rights of unmarried
spouses under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.18 The majority held that marriage is a relevant
difference upon which distinctions may be drawn. A major
consideration in the judgment was that it is an individual
choice whether to marry, and that autonomy should be

15

Sorochan v Sorochan, [1986] 2 SCR 38 at 50, (1986) 29 DLR (4th) 1
[Sorochan].

16

Peter v Beblow, [1993] 1 SCR 980 at 997, (1992) 101 DLR (4th) 621
[Peter].

17

Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4
SCR 325 [Walsh].

18

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11 [Charter].
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respected by not imposing the marital property regime on those
who did not choose it.19
Some Canadian provinces and territories have chosen
to include unmarried couples in their family property regimes.
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nunavut and Northwest Territories
have extended their definition of “spouse” to include unmarried
persons who have cohabited for a certain period, including for
the purposes of family property division. Nova Scotia allows
unmarried couples to opt into the property regime through
registration. The law of Quebec only recognizes marriages and
registered civil unions.20 British Columbia’s new Family Law
Act21 will for the first time include unmarried persons who have
lived in a “marriage-like relationship” for at least 2 years in the
family property regime, which I will discuss further below. In
the jurisdictions where they are still excluded, unmarried
cohabitants must continue to rely on resulting trust and the law
of unjust enrichment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Kerr and Mr. Baranow began their relationship in 1981
and lived together for 25 years, during which time they built
their "dream home" on property owned by Mr. Baranow known
19

Walsh, supra note 19 at para 43.

20

However, at the time of writing, a constitutional equality rights
challenge to the exclusion of unregistered relationships in Quebec
from all family law protections in the Quebec Civil Code, including
spousal support and property division, is pending before the Supreme
Court of Canada. The challenge was successful at the Quebec Court
of Appeal on the spousal support issue, but not the property issue in
light of Walsh (Droit de la famille — 102866, 2010 QCCA 1978,
(2010) 89 RFL (6th) 1, leave to appeal to SCC granted, Québec (PG)
c A, [2011] 1 SCR ix).

21

Bill C-16, Family Law Act, 4th Sess, 39th Leg, British Columbia,
2011 (as passed 23 November 2011).
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as the Wall Street property. He paid for the construction, while
she was involved with planning, interior decorating and
cleaning. The property increased in value over the course of the
relationship from $205,000 to $942,50022 and Ms. Kerr
claimed a share of the property based on resulting trust and
unjust enrichment.
Mr. Baranow came into the relationship wealthier than
Ms. Kerr, who was in financial trouble after her divorce due to
having guaranteed some of her former husband's debt. She had
a home known as the Coleman property, which was subject to
foreclosure. Because she could not afford to save the property,
Mr. Baranow paid to acquire it and guaranteed a new
mortgage. During the relationship, the couple kept separate
finances. Mr. Baranow was responsible for the mortgage
payments on both properties, while Ms. Kerr paid other
household expenses. The Coleman property was eventually
sold. The couple did not have any children together, but Ms.
Kerr had children from her previous marriage. She suffered a
stroke in 1991, which left her in need of care and unable to
return to work. The relationship deteriorated and in 2006 Mr.
Baranow decided he did not want her to return home after a
hospital stay for surgery.23
The trial judge awarded Ms. Kerr a monetary award of
$315,000, which represented a one-third interest in the Wall
Street property, on the basis of resulting trust.24 The trial judge
also held that Ms. Kerr was entitled to the $315,000 as
compensation for unjust enrichment.25 Her claim for unjust
enrichment was based on gratuitous transfers of property to Mr.
22
23

Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 174.
Ibid at paras 170, 172, 175.

24

Ibid at para 84.

25

Kerr v Baranow, 2007 BCSC 1863 at para 100, (2007) 47 RFL (6th)
103 [Kerr, BCSC].
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Baranow and her equity in the Coleman property, in addition to
a number of benefits provided by her including household
expenses, spousal services, and assistance with planning and
purchase of chattels for the new home.26 The trial judge
rejected Mr. Baranow's claim for unjust enrichment because
Ms. Kerr did most housework and paid household expenses
over the course of the relationship, except for a short one-anda-half year period at the end of the relationship when he cared
for her.27
The resulting trust was overturned by the BC Court of
Appeal due to the trial judge's factual errors in finding that Ms.
Kerr had gratuitously transferred property to Mr. Baranow and
that she had equity in the Coleman property which, when sold,
was contributed to the new home.28 The Court of Appeal also
overturned Ms. Kerr's unjust enrichment claim on the basis that
Mr. Baranow's contributions constituted a juristic reason for
the enrichment. His contributions included paying the
mortgage and other expenses, taking early retirement, and
caring for Ms. Kerr after her stroke.29 The Court of Appeal
ordered a re-hearing of Mr. Baranow's unjust enrichment claim,
and Ms. Kerr’s claim was dismissed.
While this comment will focus on the unjust
enrichment claim in Kerr v. Baranow, the facts and result of
the companion case Vanasse v. Seguin are useful for the
purpose of comparison. Ms. Vanasse and Mr. Seguin were in a
relationship for 12 years and had two children together. She left
her job to take on most domestic responsibilities, while he
worked to develop a company that was eventually sold for $11
26

Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 186.

27

Kerr, BCSC, supra note 27 at para 87.

28

Ibid at para 182.

29

Kerr, SCC supra note 1 at para 188.

Share the Wealth?

million. Ms. Vanasse received a monetary award representing a
portion of the increase in the value of the business based on
unjust enrichment.30 The trial judge divided the relationship
into three distinct periods. Unjust enrichment was established
during the second period when Ms. Vanasse stayed home with
the children and Mr. Seguin worked long hours up until the
time his company was sold. There was no unjust enrichment
during the first period and third periods of the relationship. The
first period took place before they had children and both
worked full time and kept separate finances. During the third
period, after the company was sold, Ms. Vanasse continued
with the household responsibilities and Mr. Seguin worked
mostly from home and was more available to the family.
During the first and third periods, their contributions were
described as “proportionate”.31
The contributions of Ms. Vanasse during the period of
unjust enrichment were directly linked to Mr. Seguin’s
business success, as he could not have put all of his energy into
the company without Ms. Vanasse assuming all of the
household responsibilities. A monetary award was appropriate
given Mr. Seguin’s ability to pay and the lack of a sufficiently
direct and substantial link between her contributions and the
company to warrant a constructive trust. The monetary award
was based on the pro-rated amount of the $8.4 million increase
in Mr. Seguin’s net worth for the three-and-a-half year period
of unjust enrichment. Although the most significant increase in
fact took place during the unjust enrichment period, the judge
prorated the increase over the entire twelve-year relationship
and deducted Ms. Vanasse’s interest in the home and RRSPs,
yielding an award of just under $1 million.32 The Court of
Appeal held that the award should have been calculated on a
30

Ibid at para 140.

31

Ibid at para 136.

32

Ibid at para 140.
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fee-for-services basis, and that the trial judge failed to consider
Mr. Seguin's contributions.33
HOLDING
Cromwell J. wrote the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada. The three issues related to the law of unjust
enrichment, which will be the focus of this comment, were the
nature of the monetary remedy for a successful unjust
enrichment claim, the role of mutual benefit conferral, and the
role of the parties' legitimate expectations in the unjust
enrichment analysis. The Court also dealt with the status of the
“common intention resulting trust”, and decided that it is
doctrinally unsound and has no further role to play in the
resolution of domestic cases. Unjust enrichment provides a less
artificial and more principled basis for recovery.34
The Court confirmed that the elements of an unjust
enrichment claim are an enrichment, a corresponding
deprivation, and the absence of a juristic reason for the
enrichment. The remedy is for the defendant to reverse the
unjust enrichment.35 Peter v. Beblow established that a
monetary award is the preferred remedy. Where a monetary
award is insufficient, a constructive trust may be imposed if the
claimant can show a nexus between her contributions and the
specific property.36 The Court noted that there has been a
widespread view that the only two remedial options are a
constructive trust or a monetary award calculated on a “valuereceived” basis (also referred to as fee-for-services or quantum
meruit). It has been unclear whether it is possible to calculate
33

Ibid at para 127.

34

Ibid at para 28.

35

Ibid at para 46.

36

Ibid at para 50.
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the award on a “value-survived” basis; giving the claimant a
share of the increase in wealth over the course of the
relationship.37
Monetary Remedy for Unjust Enrichment
The Court held that a monetary remedy for unjust enrichment
need not be calculated on a fee-for-services basis. The remedial
dichotomy between value received and constructive trust is
based on the view that there are only two types of claims: a
claim for the provision of unpaid services, and a claim for
contribution to the acquisition, improvement, maintenance or
preservation of a specific property. However, the Court
identified a third basis for recovery: a situation where the
parties were engaged in a joint family venture (“JFV”) and
both parties made contributions linked to the generation of
wealth, but one party retained a disproportionate share of the
assets. In such a case, the monetary award should reflect the
share of the wealth proportionate to the claimant's
contributions,38 which corresponds to the value-survived
method.
Thus, in order for a claimant to get a monetary award
for unjust enrichment based on value survived, she must show
first that the couple was engaged in a JFV, and second that her
contributions were linked to the accumulation of wealth. Upon
proof of these two elements, the wealth will not necessarily be
split equally between the parties but will be proportional to
each person's contributions. The Court stated that this approach
is consistent with Walsh, which emphasized the importance of
autonomy but approved of the use of unjust enrichment “to

37

Ibid at para 49, 57.

38

Ibid at paras 59-60, 87.
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respond to the plethora of forms and functions of common law
relationships.”39
Cohabitation with a partner does not raise a
presumption of a JFV.40 The Court provided relevant factors to
analyze the relationship under four headings: mutual effort,
economic integration, actual intent, and priority of the family.
None of the factors are required for a finding of a JFV, and the
list of factors is not closed. The factors are taken from several
prior cases of unjust enrichment. Although the Court refers to
prior cases such as Pettkus and Peter as examples of a JFV, the
requirement that a JFV be shown as a separate test for the
value-survived remedy is new.
“Mutual effort” concerns whether the parties worked
toward common goals, and includes factors such as the pooling
of effort and resources including domestic labour, the decision
to have children, and the length of the relationship. "Economic
integration" relates to how financially interdependent the
parties were and includes factors such as a joint bank account,
the sharing of expenses, and common savings. Under the
heading of “actual intent”, the Court emphasized the
importance of autonomy in domestic relationships. Since
partners may make a deliberate choice not to marry, their actual
intent whether to be economically intertwined must be given
considerable weight. Relevant factors include acceptance that
the relationship is equivalent to marriage, conduct that
indicates an intent to share wealth, and plans for distribution of
property on death. Title to property may also reflect an intent to
share wealth. Interestingly, although the common intention
resulting trust approach was rejected, intent is an important
factor in the unjust enrichment analysis. The final heading is
“priority of the family” which includes detrimental reliance on
39

Ibid at paras 81-82.

40

Ibid at paras 84-85.

Share the Wealth?

the relationship such as leaving the workforce, relocating or
foregoing career or educational advancement.41
Role of Mutual Benefit Conferral
When an unjust enrichment claim is based on a JFV, the fact
that both parties conferred benefits on one another is implicitly
taken into account in determining the share of wealth
proportionate to each person's contributions. The approach is
different on a fee-for-services claim, in which case mutual
benefits should generally be considered at the defence and
remedy stage, with the effect of reducing the claimant's
recovery by the amount of the countervailing benefit
provided.42 Mutual benefit may also play a limited role at the
juristic reason stage if it provides evidence that the enrichment
was just.43
Role of the Parties' Legitimate Expectations
In the earlier unjust enrichment cases such as Pettkus and
Sorochan, the claimant's legitimate expectations that she would
get a share of property and the defendant's knowledge of those
expectations were taken into account as part of the juristic
reason analysis. The principle was that it would be unjust for
the defendant to retain benefits that he accepted with the
knowledge that the claimant expected to be compensated. The
Court decided that this analysis should no longer be
undertaken.44

41

Ibid at paras 91-99.

42

Ibid at paras 110-111.

43

Ibid at para 116.

44

Ibid at para 121.
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Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co45 set out a two-step test
for juristic reason. The first step is to determine whether there
is a juristic reason in established categories such as a contract
or gift. If not, in the second step the defendant can establish a
new juristic reason. The new approach is that the legitimate
expectations of both parties can be considered at the second
stage where the defendant seeks to establish a new juristic
reason. For example, reasonable expectations can establish that
there was a “bargain” between the parties as to whether the
defendant would retain the benefits.46
Disposition of the Kerr v Baranow Appeal
While the Court of Appeal was correct to dismiss Ms. Kerr's
resulting trust claim, it should not have dismissed her unjust
enrichment claim. Instead, a new trial was ordered to re-hear
both Ms. Kerr's and Mr. Baranow's unjust enrichment claims.
The trial judge's error regarding Ms. Kerr's equity in the
Coleman property significantly undermined the trial judgment.
While the trial judge referred to various other benefits provided
by Ms. Kerr, he did not make specific findings as to their value,
and did not evaluate Mr. Baranow's contributions.47
Even if Ms. Kerr's unjust enrichment claim had been
made out, the Court also decided that the factual record was
insufficient to determine whether there was a JFV, because
“[t]here are few findings of fact relevant to the key question of
whether the parties' relationship constituted a joint family
venture.” Further, the Court suggested that “the findings made
do not appear to demonstrate a joint family venture,” but that it

45

Garland v Consumers' Gas Co, 2004 SCC 25, [2004] 1 SCR 629.

46

Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at paras 123-124.

47

Ibid at para 196.
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would be unfair to reach that conclusion without a full
hearing.48
Disposition of the Vanasse v. Seguin Appeal
By contrast, the Court found that the trial record in Vanasse v.
Seguin did provide sufficient evidence to analyze the facts
under the four headings and to find a JFV. Key factors were the
fact that Ms. Vanasse gave up her career to run the home and
care for the children while Mr. Seguin worked long hours, that
she was financially dependent upon him, and that they intended
to marry and viewed themselves as the equivalent of a married
couple. Mr. Seguin's sacrifices made for the family also
supported the finding of a JFV. There was a clear link between
the contributions of Ms. Vanasse and the accumulation of
wealth, since Mr. Seguin was free from household and childrearing responsibilities to focus his efforts on the company.49
The Court did not comment on the trial judge’s method of
dividing up the relationship into segments, but held that the
approach was reasonable in the circumstances and, while it
should not be used as a template for future cases, it was entitled
to deference on appeal as an assessment of damages.50
CASE ANALYSIS
The Court confirmed that a monetary award for unjust
enrichment may be calculated on a value-survived basis, but
only upon proof that the parties were engaged in a JFV. The
Court referred to earlier cases in which the terms “pooling of
effort”, “common enterprise”, “joint effort”, “teamwork”, and
even “joint family venture” were used.51 However, the
48

Ibid at paras 197-198.

49

Ibid at paras 145-157.

50

Ibid at para 158.

51

Ibid at paras 63-67.
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characterization of the JFV as a distinct test which must be
proven in accordance with the factors set out by the Court in
order to get the value-survived monetary remedy is a new
development.
I start from the proposition that the concept of a
venture between unmarried partners, in which the products of
their joint efforts are to be shared between them, is a positive
one. It is an approach that does not require the calculation of
the value of services provided by each person over the course
of the relationship, nor a proven contribution to a particular
property; approaches that can be artificial and difficult from an
evidentiary perspective. Rather, the overall wealth generated by
the couple is divided between them such that mutual benefit
conferral is recognized and one person does not unjustly retain
the benefits of the other person's contributions.
Despite this positive change, I will identify three main
problems with the Court's approach. First, the Court's
restrictive definition of the JFV may make the value-survived
remedy difficult to access for women in relationships that do
not conform to the Court's particular conception of the family.
Making remedies difficult to access contributes to women's
inequality. Second, the Court's focus on free choice and
autonomy and continued insistence that there is a fundamental
difference between married and unmarried spouses furthers the
neo-liberal trend in Canadian law. Finally, judges must still
determine each person's contributions to the venture; an
exercise fraught with value judgments, which leaves open the
possibility of women's contributions being de-valued.
The Joint Family Venture: A High Threshold
The Court stressed that unmarried couples are not a
homogeneous group and stated that “the goal is for the law of
unjust enrichment to attach consequences to the way the parties
have lived their lives, not to treat them as if they ought to have

Share the Wealth?

lived some other way.”52 While the Court purports to
objectively evaluate how the parties have actually lived, the
favourable consequence of characterizing a relationship as a
JFV only attaches to a particular type of relationship that fits
the mold provided by the Court in terms of mutual effort,
economic integration, actual intent and priority of the family.
In light of the facts in the Kerr v. Baranow case, it is
quite shocking that the Court suggested that the relationship
might not qualify as a JFV. The two were together for twentyfive years, planned and built their “dream home” together and
each paid different expenses. It was found at trial that Ms. Kerr
did all housework including after her stroke. There were
discussions that Ms. Kerr would continue to live in the house
after Mr. Baranow died, after which the house would go to Mr.
Baranow's siblings and Ms. Kerr's two sons.53 Mr. Baranow
made sacrifices for the family including taking an early
retirement, in part to care for Ms. Kerr.54
That the facts in Kerr v. Baranow do not necessarily
result in a JFV may point to the importance of certain factors
which were not present: having children together, having one
spouse give up paid labour to act exclusively as a homemaker,
and explicitly considering the relationship to be equivalent to
marriage. In the absence of these factors, autonomy may be an
overriding concern. By contrast, these factors were present in
Vanasse v. Seguin and the Court easily found a JFV. Yet, even
though it was found that Ms. Vanasse was an equal contributor
in the relationship and that her efforts were linked to Mr.
Seguin’s business success, she was only entitled to an unjust
enrichment award for the period in which she took on mostly
domestic activities. This result suggests that the Court is more
52

Ibid at para 88.

53

Kerr, BCSC, supra note 27 at paras 23, 24, 29.

54

Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 175.
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willing to find a JFV where one spouse works in the paid
labour force, while the other stays home with children and the
partners accept that the relationship is similar to a traditional
marriage. The Court in fact noted that the notion of the JFV is
similar to the rationale for matrimonial property legislation.55
In British Columbia, unmarried couples are entitled to
apply for spousal support if they have lived in a “marriage-like
relationship”,56 and Ms. Kerr was in fact awarded spousal
support from Mr. Baranow. Not recognizing a JFV in these
circumstances would lead to the result that their relationship is
“marriage-like” within the meaning of the Family Relations Act
but does not qualify as a JFV. It is not necessarily problematic
that the criteria for spousal support and a value-survived unjust
enrichment award differ. Spousal support serves various
objectives including the relief of economic hardship arising
from the relationship, while unjust enrichment is concerned
with the unjust retention of benefits. However, the fact that the
JFV is a higher threshold than “marriage-like” illustrates how
difficult a test it is to meet.
The Court presented the analysis in a formalistic
manner. The identification of a JFV is an exercise in discerning
the facts, “tak[ing] into account the particular circumstances of
the particular relationship" and discovering "how the parties
actually lived their lives, not . . . the court's view of how they
ought to have done so.”57 This system of legal reasoning which
attempts to be impartial, neutral and objective is similar to what
Ngaire Naffine has referred to as “blind justice”.58 At the same
time, the Court is comparing the relationship to factors it has
55
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set out as the “hallmarks” of the JFV,59 many of which, I argue,
represent the traditional conservative view of what a marriage
between a man and a woman should look like.
Critical Legal Theorists have argued that formalistic
legal reasoning “helps to shore up and entrench the existing,
inequitable social order by representing it as inevitable and
natural.”60 Indeed, the Court in Kerr v. Baranow, while
discussing numerous precedents in which women have
struggled to use trust remedies to get a share of property held
by their husbands, made no mention of women's inequality.
The law of unjust enrichment was presented as a gender-neutral
legal doctrine of general application, rather than as a strategy,
which, in the family law context, has been used to remedy the
unfairness experienced by women at the end of relationships
with men. Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the objective,
neutral perspective taken in formal legal reasoning is in fact the
male perspective, which advances male interests.61 However,
the development of the JFV is better viewed as a doctrine
fraught with contradictions. As T.B. Dawson has observed,
some laws will work for some women while oppressing
others.62 The recognition of a JFV for a woman who has lived
in a traditional relationship caring for children is no doubt a
good result, since single mothers face one of the highest levels
of poverty in Canada.63 By shifting wealth into the hands of
59
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(some) women, the JFV can be used to further (some) women's
equality.
However, due to the high threshold for the JFV, more
women are left with the status quo. This result reflects the
limitations of formal equality arguments that have been made
in the development of the law of unjust enrichment. Many of
the arguments related to common-law partners have rested on
the idea that they are exactly the same as married couples. For
example, Ms. Becker and Mr. Pettkus were described as living
together “as husband and wife, although unmarried.”64
Although the formal equality challenge in Walsh failed, the
definition of the JFV illustrates how formal equality ideas
about common-law partners still underpin the unjust
enrichment analysis. Unfortunately, the Court did not accept
L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s argument in Walsh that it is the
consequences of relationship breakdown – and not necessarily
the relationships themselves – that are the same in both cases.65
In the absence of a JFV, a woman may still have a
claim in unjust enrichment but the award must be based on a
fee-for-services calculation or on a contribution to a specific
property. The effect of non-recognition of a JFV is thus biased
towards allowing the partner who holds title to more assets in
his name to keep them and to enjoy the benefits of any increase
in their value. Since, in a heterosexual relationship, the person
with more assets is likely to be the male partner, while the
negative impacts of forgone economic opportunities are likely
to be suffered by the female partner,66 the result is to perpetuate
women's inequality.
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Autonomy
Under the heading of “actual intent”, the Court asserted that
“[u]nderpinning the law of unjust enrichment is an appropriate
concern for the autonomy of the parties, and this is a
particularly important consideration in relation to domestic
partnerships.”67 Given that the word “autonomy” did not
appear in any of the earlier cases on unjust enrichment, such as
Rathwell, Pettkus, Sorochan and Peter, it is unclear how
autonomy could be said to underpin the law of unjust
enrichment. Rather, the focus on autonomy is more in line with
the view of domestic relationships taken recently by the Court
in Walsh.
Hester Lessard has explained the re-invigoration of
traditional marriage and the focus on choice in Walsh in terms
of the neo-liberal shift in Canadian law.68 The neo-liberal
movement has been marked by government efforts to shift its
responsibility for social welfare to the private sector. One way
to cause this shift between public and private is through
policies of familialization, which involve increased reliance on
families “to perform the work of social reproduction and to
care for those in need.”69 Thus, for example, the liberalization
of marriage to include same-sex couples is consistent with this
trend because it increases the number of “insiders” to the
marriage regime who can be relied on for private support.70
By endorsing the traditional account of marriage,
which excludes common-law partners, Walsh would seem to be
at odds with the neo-liberal agenda because the socially
67
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conservative, exclusionary view of marriage denies private
benefits to unmarried partners who may then look to the state
for social assistance. Lessard argues that the neo-liberal logic is
restored, however, when one considers that Walsh does not
only revive the importance of marriage but, crucially,
characterizes it as one among many lifestyle choices that
people make.71 The broader impacts of this characterization of
marriage as a choice are evident in Hodge v. Canada (Minister
of Human Resources Development)72 which denied public
benefits under a survivor's pension to an unmarried woman that
would have been available to her had she been married.
Whereas Walsh constructed choice in the liberal sense
of freedom from state power exemplified by the choice not to
marry, Hodge constructed choice in the neo-liberal sense as the
marker of the responsible individual. For women, the
underlying assumption is that material security is achieved
through marriage to a man. Thus, women who do not make the
choice to marry have not acted responsibly and should not
expect to get the benefits.73
The Court's focus on choice and autonomy in Kerr v.
Baranow is consistent with the neo-liberal logic identified by
Lessard. The definition of the JFV is part of the project of revalorizing the socially conservative family. Partners whose
relationship rises to the level of the JFV display sufficient
“actual intent” to have a relationship equivalent to marriage to
justify a property division similar to that available to married
partners. A woman whose relationship does not qualify as a
JFV has made a life choice not only not to marry, but not to
structure her relationship so that it closely resembles a
71
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traditional marriage. She cannot expect the law of unjust
enrichment to undo her free choice, just as the women in Walsh
and Hodge could not expect Charter rights to undo their free
choices.74
Sherene Razack has identified problems with the
liberal rights discourse that constructs people as independent,
decontextualized individuals. The notion of free choice makes
oppression invisible; each individual woman chooses her own
fate.75 However, Razack does not discount arguments based on
women's oppression in terms of their lack of choice and
autonomy. Given the established importance of these concepts
in our legal system, using them may be an important strategic
direction.76 An argument based on lack of choice can be made
with regard to domestic partnerships, since the terms of a
relationship cannot be chosen by each individual. As
L'Heureux-Dubé J. argued in her dissenting reasons in Walsh,
for many unmarried cohabitants, the choice of one to marry is
denied by the wishes of the other, which can result in an
exploitative situation.77 Further, to the extent that a woman
does have a choice as to the terms of her relationship, it is
arguably constrained by the fact that she cannot have both an
unmarried “non-traditional” relationship characterized by a
degree of economic independence from her partner, and expect
to have a fair division of property when the relationship ends.
The shift in the law made by the Court with respect to
legitimate expectations is consistent with the characterization
of the relationship as a choice. Rather than focusing on the
74
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legitimate expectations of the woman who has provided
services with a view to being fairly compensated, the person
receiving the benefits now has the opportunity to argue that he
deliberately chose not to marry and expected her not to be
compensated. This analysis would seem to reinforce rather than
prevent the exploitative situation identified by L'Heureux-Dubé
J., in which one partner refuses to marry in order to avoid the
legal consequences.
Women's Work
Simone Wong has identified gender bias in the English
approach to constructive trusts. Today in England, common
intention to share property is understood to give rise to a
constructive trust rather than a resulting trust.78 A constructive
trust can be imposed if the defendant promised or
acknowledged an intention to share property and the claimant
acted to her detriment in reliance on the promise. Wong argues
that this approach fails to take into account the economic
inequality of women and the effects of the sexual division of
labour.79 While the focus is on finding a common intention to
share property, the cases illustrate that much turns on the
existence of a sufficient financial contribution by the claimant,
and indirect contributions such as domestic services have not
been adequately recognized.80 She suggests that the unjust
enrichment approach in Canada may be less susceptible to
gender bias due to the flexibility of considering indirect
contributions.81 Of course, the effectiveness of reducing gender
bias by taking into account domestic work depends on the
value courts are willing to place on those contributions relative
to workforce participation and financial contributions.
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The Court in Kerr v. Baranow emphasized that the
result of an unjust enrichment claim based on a JFV is that
each partner receives a share of the wealth proportionate to
their contributions. There is no presumption of equal sharing.82
Despite this clear direction from the Supreme Court of Canada,
Berend Hovius has predicted that the natural tendency will be
for courts to split the gain attributable to the JFV equally
between the partners. Noting that the exercise is one of
“making value-laden and politically charged assessments,”
Hovius asks “[w]hat judge . . . is going to find that having the
primary responsibility for child-care and the household is not
equal to financial provision?”83
Historically, women's unpaid work in the home has not
been treated as economically valuable. In Murdoch, one of the
reasons for denying a share of property to Ms. Murdoch was
that her labour “was not beyond what is normally expected of a
wife.”84 Even Laskin J., who would have allowed her claim,
recognized the value of her labour by reference to how far
beyond “normal” it was. Over time, courts began to recognize
that ordinary domestic services have economic value. In the
unjust enrichment context, this recognition culminated in the
Peter decision. However, the value of women's unpaid work
has been understated due to the historic disadvantage of women
in the workplace.85 Calculating the value of a woman's services
results in a small fee since such services are not highly valued
in the market.
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Given the history of the judicial treatment of women's
work in the home, Hovius's prediction that courts will almost
always value women's contributions equally is rather
optimistic. While progress continues to be made in the
recognition of the economic value of women's unpaid work,86
myths and stereotypes about women's work in the home
continue to play a role. Where both partners work outside the
home, some courts have been under the misperception that this
translates into both partners putting in equal amounts of work
in the home.87 In fact, most unpaid work in the home is still
done by women.88
Thus, even if Hovius's prediction holds true in a
traditional relationship where one partner works inside the
home and one undertakes paid work outside the home, women
in relationships which differ from this model, because both
partners undertake paid work or do not have children, may find
their contributions de-valued or ignored. While both Ms. Kerr
and Mr. Baranow worked outside the home until Ms. Kerr's
stroke, it was a finding of fact at trial that Ms. Kerr did all of
the housework prior to and after the stroke;89 a fact that was not
mentioned in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision.
Likewise, Ms. Vanasse received no compensation for the time
86
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where both she and Mr. Seguin worked, nor after Mr. Seguin
sold his company even though she continued to be primarily
responsible for the household and childcare.
Further, since women continue to earn less than men in
the paid work force,90 women generally have less capacity to
make financial contributions to the JFV in a heterosexual
relationship. Assuming that both partners work full time
outside the home and share the housework equally, the woman
is likely to make a smaller salary and have less money to
contribute to the purchase of assets. An unequal sharing of the
wealth generated by the JFV in such a situation thus
perpetuates the inequality, whereas an equal sharing such as
that mandated by matrimonial property legislation serves a
distributive justice function.
CONCLUSION
The concept of a joint family venture between domestic
partners in which they share the wealth generated during the
relationship is a useful concept that reflects the reality that
partners' lives are economically intertwined, both confer
various benefits on one another and both contribute to the
acquisition of wealth, regardless of who holds legal title to
property. A fair property division at the end of a domestic
relationship recognizes that the consequences of relationship
breakdown do not depend on marital status. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court of Canada has given the JFV a limited scope by
defining the JFV narrowly and by reference to factors present
in a traditional marriage. The Court introduced into the
doctrine of unjust enrichment a focus on choice and autonomy
in domestic relationships consistent with the neo-liberal agenda
90

Cara Williams, “Economic Well-being” in Women in Canada: A
Gender-Based Statistical Report (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2010),
online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-503x/2010001/article/11388-eng.pdf> at 6.

388

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 27, 2011]

and the reassertion of the fundamental importance of marriage.
A JFV is still a second-class citizen to marriage, since the
Court has mandated that sharing should not be equal but should
be proportional, which means it is left to the discretion of
courts to value women's contributions.
The British Columbia Supreme Court, on re-hearing
the unjust enrichment claims of Ms. Kerr and Mr. Baranow,
determined that they were in fact engaged in a JFV. Mr.
Baranow was unjustly enriched by Ms. Kerr’s contributions
linked to the Wall Street property, but his contributions to her
welfare and care reduced the amount she was entitled to. In the
result, she received a monetary award of $240,000, equivalent
to 25% of the value of the Wall Street property, and both
parties were entitled to keep their personal savings, of which
Mr. Baranow had significantly more. The Court emphasized
that the couple kept their finances separate during the
relationship,91 consistent with the focus on autonomy and
intent.
In British Columbia, this decision will have limited
ongoing significance when the new Family Law Act92 comes
into force. Persons who have lived in a marriage-like
relationship for at least 2 years will be subject to the same
property division as married spouses. In general, spouses will
have a right to an undivided half interest in all “family
property”, defined as property owned by at least one spouse at
the date of separation, unless defined as “excluded property”.93
Property acquired by a spouse prior to the relationship is
excluded, but any increase in its value over the course of the
relationship is not.
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If the Family Law Act had been in force, Ms. Kerr
would have been presumptively entitled to half of the increase
in the Wall Street property’s value, around $370,000, in
addition to half of all other family property owned by the
couple including Mr. Baranow’s substantial savings. Ms.
Vanasse would have been entitled to half of the increase in the
wealth generated by Mr. Seguin’s company over the course of
the entire relationship, rather than a limited time period. Both
women would have been entitled to significantly more than
they received due to unjust enrichment, without the need to
prove the existence of a JFV and to rely on the complex and
uncertain unjust enrichment and trust principles.94 This will
continue to be the reality for unmarried cohabitants in the
Canadian jurisdictions that have not chosen to include
unmarried couples in their family property regimes.
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